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Identification and the liquidity
effect: A case study
must at least be able to reproduce the economic
effects of monetary policy actions that have
been taken in the past.  Before a model’s
answers to hard questions can be trusted, it
should, at a minimum, give the right answers
to simple questions.
The purpose of this article is to review
some of the issues economists confront in
attempting to compile facts about how mone-
tary policy actions affect the economy.  The
central problem in establishing these facts is
that monetary actions often reflect policymak-
ers’ responses to nonmonetary developments in
the economy.  These responses are captured by
the notion of a policy feedback rule, which
expresses policymakers’ actions as a function
of the state of the economy.  To the extent that
a policy action is an outcome of the feedback
rule, the response of economic variables reflects
the combined effects of the action itself and of
the variables that policy reacts to.  To isolate the
effects of Fed policy actions per se, one needs
to identify the component of those actions that is
not reactive to other variables.  This is referred
Monetary policy continues to
be an active subject for de-
bate.  This is not surprising.
The monetary history of the
United States since the found-
ing of the Federal Reserve has not always been
easy.  In the 1930s, the U.S. experienced by far
the worst depression in its history, the severity
of which some observers blame on the Fed.
Starting in the mid-1960s, the country experi-
enced high inflation for two decades, which
was brought to an end only after a wrenching
recession.  The issues under debate include
whether there are changes in the Fed’s policy-
making framework that would reduce the likeli-
hood of a recurrence of this kind of instability.
Various authors, perhaps most notably Milton
Friedman, have argued that the Fed should
adopt simple rules for the conduct of monetary
policy, such as requiring that the Fed hit targets
for money growth or expected inflation.1
Debate about monetary policy issues re-
quires models.2  These are needed to make
precise the various positions in the debate and
to serve as laboratories for comparing the like-
ly operating characteristics of various policy
proposals.  Supply has expanded to meet the
increased demand:  Research on constructing
empirically plausible macroeconomic models
with money has been very active.
To build models that are empirically plau-
sible requires that we know the historical facts
about how monetary policy actions affect the
economy.  If models are to serve persuasively
as laboratories for evaluating monetary policies
that have never before been tried, then they
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to as the exogenous component of a monetary
policy action, or, as an exogenous monetary
policy shock.  With this definition, monetary
policy actions are the sum of two components:
the endogenous part of policy captured by the
feedback rule and the exogenous shock.  The
question, How does the economy respond to a
monetary policy action?, is interpreted as,
How does the economy respond to an exoge-
nous monetary policy shock?
The answers to such questions depend in
part on the assumptions—identification assump-
tions—made to isolate monetary policy shocks.
Thus, the persuasiveness of an analysis of mon-
etary policy shocks depends in an important
way on how well the researcher defends the
underlying identification assumptions.
It is important to distinguish between
questions about the economy’s response to a
monetary policy shock and questions that moti-
vate the quest for a good monetary model in
the first place, such as, What is the impact on
the economy of a change in the monetary au-
thority’s feedback rule?  Answering this ques-
tion would be straightforward if we had data
drawn from otherwise identical economies
operating under the feedback rules that we are
interested in evaluating.  We don’t.  And real
world experimentation is not an option.  The
only place we can perform experiments is in
structural models.  Giving the right answer to
the simple, less directly interesting question is
not a sufficient condition for acting on the
implications of a given model.  However, this
test does help narrow the field of choice and
gives guidance to the development of models.
This article focuses on the question, What
is the interest rate effect of a monetary policy
shock?  Below, I explain why answering this
question is not straightforward and requires
identifying assumptions.  I do this by review-
ing the evolution of views on the empirical
plausibility of the liquidity effect.  This evolu-
tion is marked by an increased recognition of
the importance of endogeneity in monetary
policy.  I then describe one set of identification
assumptions that I have used in joint work with
Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans to mea-
sure monetary policy shocks.  These are used
to extract information about monetary policy
shocks from data on the nonborrowed reserves
(NBR) of banks.3  Finally, the estimated shocks
are used to assess the interest rate effects of
monetary policy shocks.
My purpose is not just to convey substan-
tive results about the economic impact of mon-
etary policy shocks, but also to provide a case
study motivating the need for identification
assumptions, and illustrating one way to go
about defending those assumptions.
What is the liquidity effect and why
care about it?
An economic model possesses a liquidity
effect if it has the following characteristic:4
An exogenous, persistent, upward shock
in the growth rate of the monetary base
engineered by the central bank and not
associated with any current or prospec-
tive adjustment in distortionary taxes,
drives the nominal rate of interest rate
down for a significant period of time.
This definition of the liquidity effect can be
distinguished from the traditional, partial equi-
librium, liquidity effect in the literature.  That
refers to the fall in the interest rate that is re-
quired by a downward-sloped money demand
schedule when the money supply increases and
there is no change in the price level and level
of income.  Many existing general equilibrium
models that do not possess a liquidity effect in
the sense that I define it, do display a partial
equilibrium liquidity effect.5
The basic question addressed in the empir-
ical liquidity effect literature is:
What do the data say about the relative
plausibility of the following two types of
models: models with a liquidity effect,
and models with the implication that an
exogenous increase in the monetary base
drives the nominal rate of interest up?
This question is interesting because the
answer one selects has important implications
for the construction of quantitative macroeco-
nomic models with money.  (This is discussed
further in Christiano [1991] and Christiano and
Eichenbaum [1995].)
Evolution of views on the empirical
status of the liquidity effect
Historically, economists have taken the
plausibility of the liquidity effect for granted.
This is reflected in standard intermediate mac-
roeconomics textbooks, which feature models
in which liquidity effects play a key role in the
monetary transmission mechanism.  However,ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 4
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money growth, if persistent, leads
to a rise in the nominal rate of
interest.  Now, as noted by Pagan
and Robertson (1995), the con-
sensus has moved back toward the
traditional position in favor of
liquidity effects.6  This in turn has
sparked efforts to identify frictions
which allow monetary models to
display a liquidity effect.
A case can be made that this
evolution in thinking reflects
early analysts’ tendency to focus
exclusively on broader monetary
aggregates and to ignore the
sources of endogeneity in money.
Consider the results reported in
figures 1–3, taken from Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
They display the cross-correlation
between different monetary ag-
gregates and the federal funds
rate, with plus and minus one-standard-devia-
tion confidence bands.  The monetary aggre-
gates examined include nonborrowed reserves
(NBR), the monetary base (M0), and M1.
(The interest rate and the monetary aggregates
were logged and Hodrick-Prescott filtered prior
to the computations.)7  The data display three
key features: (1) the broad monetary aggre-
gates covary positively with current and future
values of the interest rate; (2) they covary
negatively with past values of the interest rate;
and (3) NBR covaries negatively
with current and future values of
the interest rate.
In view of the first feature, it
is perhaps not surprising that
analysts who assumed the endog-
enous component of money is
small and focused on broader
monetary aggregates, arrived at
the view that the evidence does
not support an important liquidity
effect.  Early research which
recognized the potential role of
endogeneity took the view that
the Fed conducts monetary policy
by targeting the nominal interest
rate.8  Under this view, exoge-
nous innovations in base growth
engineered by the central bank are
when researchers initially attempted to quantify
the liquidity effect using data, they came
away quite skeptical as to its plausibility.
(Examples include Stephen King [1983],
Melvin [1983], and Mishkin [1983].)  This had
an impact on the development of monetary
business cycle models.  For example, Barro
(1987) and Robert King (1991) cite these find-
ings as evidence in support of the first wave of
monetized real business cycle models.  These
models imply that an exogenous increase in
FIGURE 2
Correlation between the federal funds rate(t)
and the monetary base(t–k)
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FIGURE 3
Correlation between the federal funds
rate(t) and M1(t–k)
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While the correlations de-
scribed above go a long way
toward explaining why different
researchers have reached different
conclusions about the empirical
status of liquidity effects, they do
not tell the whole story.  That is
because the liquidity effect per-
tains to the sign (whether positive
or negative) of the correlation
between the components of inter-
est rates and money that reflect
exogenous disturbances to mone-
tary policy.  Raw correlations, by
contrast, reflect the joint move-
ments of interest rates and money
arising due to the effects of all
shocks, not just exogenous mone-
tary policy shocks.  To see why this distinction
probably matters, consider the correlation be-
tween logged and detrended gross domestic
product (GDP) and NBR in figure 4.9  The fact
that the contemporaneous correlation is signifi-
cantly negative may reflect a policy of “leaning
against the wind” at the Fed.  If so, then the raw
correlation between interest rates and NBR
reflects in part the response of both variables
to whatever shocks are driving GDP.  Such
shocks could in principle produce a positive
or negative correlation between
money and interest rates, inde-
pendent of whether the liquidity
effect is operative.
Coleman, Gilles, and Labadie
(1996) present a couple of hypo-
thetical examples that illustrate
this and underscore the impor-
tance of isolating the exogenous
monetary policy component of a
monetary indicator variable.
They are also useful for illustrat-
ing the practical steps researchers
take to build confidence that the
shocks they have isolated are
indeed monetary policy shocks.
One of Coleman et al.’s ex-
amples describes an economy in
which there is no liquidity effect
associated with a monetary shock,
yet the correlation between non-
associated with innovations in the interest rate.
Feature two of the data helps explain why these
analysts favor the liquidity effect view that an
upward revision in the Fed’s interest rate target
is implemented by engineering a reduction in
the money supply.  Finally, beginning with
Thornton (1988), researchers have begun work-
ing with NBR.  In light of feature three, it is
perhaps not surprising that they have tended to
conclude that the evidence favors the liquidity
effect view.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 6
borrowed reserves and the interest rate is nega-
tive.  Suppose the Fed signals policy shifts in
advance of actually implementing them, and a
signal of an imminent increase in the growth of
total reserves produces an immediate rise in the
interest rate.  Suppose the rise in the interest
rate results in an accommodation at the dis-
count window, and the Fed does not wish to
see this reflected in a rise in total reserves.
This would require the Fed to respond by re-
ducing nonborrowed reserves.10 Under these
circumstances, one would expect a negative
correlation between nonborrowed reserves and
the interest rate, even though there is no liquid-
ity effect at all.  The sign of the correlation
simply reflects technical details about how the
Fed allocates the different tasks of monetary
policy between the discount window and the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
In another of Coleman et al.’s examples, the
economy is driven by a single shock, e, that is
nonmonetary in origin.  They assume that the
shock drives up the equilibrium nominal rate of
interest, R, and that this produces an accommo-
dation at the Federal Reserve’s discount window.
The FOMC is assumed to at least partially offset
the impact on total bank reserves by undertaking
contractionary open market operations which
have the effect of reducing NBR.  I will refer to
the Fed’s presumed perception that the window
overreacts to private economy shocks as the
overaccommodation hypothesis.  Under this
hypothesis, the Fed partially (or perhaps even
fully) offsets the impact on total reserves, TR,
of the surge in discount window borrowing,
BR, that follows a positive realization of e.
Evidently, under this scenario there could be  a
negative correlation between NBR and R, even
though there are no policy shocks at all.
A formal example of the pitfalls of
ignoring endogeneity
A problem which potentially limits the
practical interest of the second example de-
scribed above is its implication that NBR and
TR are negatively related.  This implication is
at variance with the data.  But, there is a plau-
sible way around this, which involves incorpo-
rating another shock which causes these two
variables to move together.  Accordingly, let
there be an exogenous policy shock to TR, m,
which also has a positive impact on NBR.
Then it is possible to have Cov(TR, NBR) > 0
and Cov(NBR, R) < 0 simultaneously, as is the
case in the data.  Most significantly, this pat-
tern of covariances could occur even if a posi-
tive, exogenous innovation to total reserves
induced by the FOMC (that is, a positive
value of m) led to a rise in R, that is, even if
there were no liquidity effect.  To make these
observations clear, it is necessary to lay the
example out formally.
Where relevant, I assume that random
variables are independently distributed over
time.11 I also assume that the FOMC’s money
supply shock, m, and private economy shock,
e, are mutually uncorrelated.  The example has
three behavioral equations—two equations
describe the policy rules of the FOMC and of
the discount window, and the third characteriz-
es the reduced-form relationship between the
equilibrium interest rate and the fundamental
shocks—and one definitional equation relating
TR, BR, and NBR.
Let the policy rule of the FOMC be:
TR =  m + e + u .
The shock, u, is assumed to be uncorrelated
with the other shocks, and is included to cap-
ture the possibility that there are exogenous
shocks to the reserves emanating from the
discount window.  These could reflect such
things as changes in capital requirements that
are exogenous to private economy disturbanc-
es, here summarized by e.  Presumably, most
analysts would consider the exogenous compo-
nent of discount window shocks to be small.
However, it is useful to include it here for
completeness.
The policy rule of the discount window is:
   BR = gR + au, a, g, > 0.
With the exception of the fact that I leave out a
role for the discount rate, this specification is
pretty standard.  Leaving out the discount rate
does not detract from the central points I am
trying to make.
The reduced-form equation relating the
monetary policy shocks, m and u, and the pri-
vate economy shock, e, to the equilibrium
interest rate, R, is assumed to be:
  R = a1m + a2e + a3u, a2 > 0.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 7
One would want to allow a1 ¹  a3 since m and u
presumably have different dynamic implications
for the evolution of total reserves.12
The definition of NBR implies:
  NBR º TR – BR = (1 – a1g )m +
(1 – a2g)e + (1 – a3g – a)u.
Throughout, I will assume 1 – a1g > 0.  This
assumption is redundant when a1 < 0 (that is,
there is a liquidity effect), given my assumption
g > 0.  In keeping with the spirit of the Coleman
et al. example, I assume 1 – a3g – a < 0, so that
the effects of an exogenous increase in reserves
supplied at the window are (partially) offset by
the FOMC.  The overaccommodation hypothe-
sis corresponds to the assumption 1 – a2g < 0.13
It is easily confirmed that:
Cov(NBR, R) = a1(1 – a1g)s 2
m + a2(1 – a2g)m2
e +
a3(1– a3g – a)s 2
u.
Cov(NBR, TR) = (1 – a1g)s2
m + (1– a2g)s2
e +
(1 – a3g – a)s2
u.
A parameterization which implies the right
sign pattern of covariances is su = 0.1, sm = se =
g = 1, a1 = 0.01, a2 = 1.5, a3 = 1.0, a = g.   In this
case, Cov(NBR, R) = –0.8, Cov(NBR, TR) = 0.39.
Significantly, in this parameterization there is no
liquidity effect, since a1, a3 > 0.
Avoiding the pitfalls in the example
The preceding example illustrates the
principle that one cannot infer anything about
the liquidity effect based on the sign pattern
of covariances among Cov(TR, NBR) and
Cov(NBR, R).  Of course, this is not a new
principle.  Indeed, it is an important theme of
the policy shock literature.  For example,
Christiano and Eichenbaum state that correla-
tions “. . . cannot be taken as evidence of any
specific causal mechanism.    In particular,
they cannot be used to formally infer that
unanticipated expansionary monetary policy
disturbances cause interest rates to fall. . . .”14
They argue that to obtain evidence on the
liquidity effect “. . . requires identifying
assumptions that are sufficiently strong to
isolate a measure of monetary policy distur-
bances.”15  In the context of the above exam-
ple, this means the identifying assumptions
have to enable one to isolate the FOMC shock
to money, m, or the discount window shock to
money, u.  Below, I describe the strategy for
doing this adopted by Christiano and Eichen-




I first consider the case in which shocks
emanating from the discount window, u, are
small enough to ignore.  To remove the effects
of e from NBR, CEE make the following iden-
tification assumption:  that aggregate output, y,
and the aggregate price level, p, contemporane-
ously reflect the effects of e, and not the effects
of  m.16  Their a priori reasoning behind this
crucial recursiveness assumption is that—
particularly at the monthly level of time aggre-
gation—it is reasonable to think that monetary
policy actions have essentially no contempora-
neous impact on aggregate output and the ag-
gregate price level.  Below, I review the other
efforts made by CEE to check the plausibility
of this identifying assumption.
The CEE identifying assumption rational-
izes the following two-step procedure for iso-
lating the monetary policy shock, m.17  First, do
an ordinary least squares regression of nonbor-
rowed reserves on y and p and treat the residual
as something that contains only m and not e.  In
the second stage, regress the interest rate on the
residual.  In the example, the residual from the
first-stage regression would be (1 – a1g)m if the
data set were large. The coefficients in the
regression of the interest rate and of TR on the
residuals from the first-stage regression are
a1/(1 – a1g) and 1/(1 – a1g), respectively.  Con-
sistent with the sign assumption on (1 – a1g)
made above, the latter regression coefficient
turns out in practice to be positive, so that the
sign of the first regression coefficient coincides
with that of a1.  Thus, under the CEE identifi-
cation assumption, the sign of the regression of
the interest rate on the residuals from the first-
stage regression constitutes a valid estimate of
the sign of the liquidity effect and avoids the
pitfalls discussed above.
Taking discount window shocks
into account
The preceding analysis assumes that exoge-
nous discount window shocks, u, are negligible.
If they were important, then CEE’s inferenceECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 8
could be distorted.  In particular, the contem-
poraneous interest rate impact of a positive
monetary policy shock, measured by CEE’s
two-stage procedure, is proportional to:
           a1(1 – a1g)s 2
m + a3(1 – a3g – a)s2
u.
Similarly, the contemporaneous impact on TR
is proportional to:
(1 – a1g)s2
m + (1 – a3g – a)s2
u.
Once again, the fact that the latter term
is positive in the data and our assumption
1 – a3g – a < 0 imply 1 – a1g > 0.  However,
now the CEE measure of the interest rate re-
sponse to a positive money supply shock could
be negative, even if a1, a3 > 0, that is, even if
there is no liquidity effect; but this requires
that s2
u be large.
This raises the possibility that CEE’s mea-
sure of monetary policy shocks could be con-
taminated by u.  Under these circumstances,
their estimate of a monetary policy shock, m, is
actually (1 – a1g)m + (1 – a3g – a)u.18  In the
extreme case where m is negligible and all
monetary policy shocks correspond to u, then
if (1 – a3g – a) is negative, what they interpret
as a positive money supply shock is actually a
negative shock.
Avoiding the pitfalls of endogeneity
in practice
The basic problem that must be addressed
in estimating the effects of exogenous shocks
to monetary policy is how to measure the
shocks themselves.  In addition, the discussion
above highlights the importance of defending
the analysis against two potential pitfalls:
(1) the possibility that what is estimated to be a
positive money supply shock is actually a neg-
ative money supply shock, and (2) the possibil-
ity that what is estimated to be a positive mon-
ey supply shock is actually some other shock to
the private economy.  The evidence reported
below suggests that the NBR-based procedure
for isolating monetary policy shocks avoids
these pitfalls.
The key to the CEE strategy for extract-
ing money supply shocks from data on non-
borrowed reserves lies in specifying a policy
rule for the Fed:
   NBRt = ƒ (Wt) + mt,
where Wt is the information set available to the
monetary authorities, ƒ is a linear function, and
              Wt = {yt, pt, lagged variables}.
Here, pt includes the log of the aggregate
price index and of an index of commodity
prices, while yt is the log of GDP.  As before,
mt is the monetary policy shock.  The key iden-
tifying assumption, aside from the linearity of
ƒ and the specification of Wt, is:
      mt is uncorrelated with the elements in Wt.
As discussed previously, this assumption corre-
sponds to the idea that the relationship between
p and y on the one hand, and monetary actions
on the other, is recursive: Within a given period,
the former affect the latter, but the latter have no
impact on the former.
Under the recursiveness identifying as-
sumption, the monetary policy shock can be
estimated as the residual in the ordinary least
squares regression of nonborrowed reserves on
Wt.19  The dynamic impact on other variables
may be obtained from the regression coeffi-
cients in a second-stage regression of those
variables on current and past values of the
estimated residuals.  The resulting regression
coefficients are referred to as impulse response
functions.  There is an asymptotically equiva-
lent method for obtaining the impulse response
functions based on vector autoregressions.
This is the method that was actually used to
obtain the impulse response functions displayed
in figures 5 and 6. (For technical details on
how this was done, see Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans [1996a,b].)  The results are
based on quarterly data and the mnemonics
displayed in the figures have the following
interpretation.  The variable NBRD corre-
sponds to minus one times the log of nonbor-
rowed reserves, FF corresponds to the federal
funds rate, EMPL corresponds to the log of
employment, RSALES corresponds to the level
of retail sales, TRADE PROF corresponds to
the level of profits in the retail trade sector, NF
PROF corresponds to the level of profits of
nonfinancial corporations, and MFG INV
corresponds to manufacturing inventories.
Variables expressed in logs have been multi-
plied by 100.  Units of measure are indicated
in the figures.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 9
Consider figure 5, which reports the im-
pact of a contractionary monetary policy shock
on monetary and interest rate variables.  Panel
A of figure 5 indicates that a monetary policy
shock corresponds to a persistent drop in the
stock of nonborrowed reserves, beginning with
a 1.5 percent drop (recall a positive shock to
NBRD corresponds to a negative shock to
NBR).  Interest rates rise for roughly one year,
with increases of 30 and 50 basis points in the
first two quarters, respectively.  Robustness
analyses suggest that the reliable result here is
the sign of the interest rate response, not its
precise magnitude.20
As indicated above, there is a need to
defend these results against several possibili-
ties.  Consider first the possibility that the
shock to nonborrowed reserves miscalculates
the sign of the monetary shock.  This could
happen for two reasons.  The first of the two
Coleman et al. examples suggests the possibili-
ty that a negative shock to nonborrowed re-
serves actually corresponds to a positive fu-
ture shock to the money supply.  The second
example suggests the possibility that a nega-
tive nonborrowed reserves shock could actu-
ally correspond to an overall positive money
supply shock emanating from the discount
window and partially offset by the FOMC.
The plausibility of these hypotheses can be
assessed by examining panels B and D of fig-
ure 5.  These show that total reserves of banks
and M1 both drop for one or two years after a
negative shock to nonborrowed reserves.
Under these circumstances, it seems unlikely
that the negative shock to nonborrowed re-
serves is really a positive shock to current or
future total reserves.
Now consider the possibility that the nega-
tive shock to nonborrowed reserves really
reflects the Fed’s reaction to a private economy
shock, which drives the interest rate up and
leads to an overaccommodation (from the per-
spective of the FOMC) by the discount window.
One possibility is that the private economy
shock is a positive shock to money demand by
the nonbank public.  However, this seems un-
likely given the fall in M1.  One would expect
FIGURE 5
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FIGURE 6
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such a positive money demand shock to raise
interest rates and encourage banks to increase
the money multiplier.  Another possibility is that
the positive money demand shock represents an
increased demand for reserves by banks; but this
seems unlikely given the fall in total reserves.
It is hard to see why the Fed would respond to
an increased desire for reserves on the part of
the banking system by reducing the quantity of
those reserves.
Conclusion
This article presented a case study in ana-
lyzing the macroeconomic effects of a mone-
tary policy shock.  The case study was used to
illustrate the role of identifying assumptions
and how, in practice, one can test those identi-
fying assumptions.
The results indicate that contractionary
monetary policy actions do not produce an
immediate fall in interest rates, as the initial
monetized real business cycle models predict.
The point estimates suggest that, instead, inter-
est rates rise for about a year after a typical
monetary contraction.  They also indicate, as
seen in figure 6, that output, employment,
prices, retail sales, and profits fall, while in-
ventories and unemployment rise.
NOTES
1For a discussion of a feasible way to target expected
inflation, see Friedman’s (1992), pp. 227–229, review of
Hetzel’s (1991) proposal.
2The following remarks draw heavily on Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996a).
3In our work, we also extract monetary policy shocks
from interest rate data.  I do not survey this work here.
4This section and the next draw heavily on the material in
Christiano (1995).
5This can happen if what earlier writers called the price
and income effects dominate the partial equilibrium
liquidity effect, that is, if the positive price and income
responses to a money shock exert a sufficiently strong
increase in money demand.
6There does seem to be a consensus that interest rates do
not rise significantly after a money injection.  There is
less agreement on the magnitude of an interest rate drop
after a monetary injection.
7The nonborrowed reserves data were obtained from Steve
Strongin, then at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
The other data were taken from CITIBASE.  The federal
funds rate, monetary base, and M1 have mnemonics
FFYF, FMBASE, and FM1, respectively.  The results
reported in figures 1–3 are robust to alternative detrending
procedures and sample periods.  See Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) for details.
8See, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and
Sims (1986).
9The GDP data are taken from CITIBASE.
10Total reserves is the sum of reserves borrowed from the
Fed’s discount window (borrowed reserves) and the rest
(nonborrowed reserves).
11One interpretation of this assumption is that I am think-
ing about the (non-orthogonalized) vector autoregressive
innovations in R, NBR, BR, and TR.  In empirical work
these variables are typically specified in logs, whereas in
the example they are specified in levels.  Presumably, this
distinction is inessential.
12As long as a1 ¹ a3, the decomposition, between borrowed
and nonborrowed components, of disturbances to total
reserves matters for the interest rate.  There are several
reasons to think that this might be true.  One of these is
based on the notion that banks regard the privilege of
going to the window as an option, in which case they may
be reluctant to exercise that option.  In this case, the Fed
could raise interest rates by holding total reserves fixed,
but reducing the nonborrowed component.  To see that
this could drive up the interest rate (and, hence affect real
economic decisions), consider a draining action by the
New York Fed’s trading desk.  Initially, banks would
scramble on the fed funds market to make up the shortfall.
They would do this before going to the discount window,
since going to the window deprives them of the opportu-
nity to do so again in the near future.  But, the reserves
shortfall cannot be made up in the fed funds market, and
so money market rates will be bid up.  Eventually, they
would have to rise enough to overcome banks’ reluctance
to go to the window.  With a low enough short-run demand
elasticity for reserves (due, say, to an inability to quickly
alter the liability structure of their balance sheets), banks
would go to the window and borrow the full amount of
the desk’s draining action, leaving total reserves—but not
the interest rates—unchanged.
13This hypothesis has some empirical appeal, because
NBR and output are negatively contemporaneously corre-
lated (see figure 4).  This is an implication of the example,
assuming output is positively correlated with e and only
weakly related to m and u.
14Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), p. 5.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 12
15Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), p. 13.
16One reason why both p and y might be needed to pin
down e is that e is itself a linear combination of two
private economy shocks, that is, e = a1e1 + a2e2.  Then, to
get e, both p and y are useful, to the extent that these
variables are themselves linearly related to e1 and e2.
17CEE actually used an asymptotically equivalent proce-
dure which is based on vector autoregressions.  For more
details, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996a,b).
18If p and y were functions not just of e, but also of u, then
there would be no problem: the residual in the first-stage
regression would be (1 – a1, g)m, as before. I do not
consider this case because the reasoning underlying the
notion that p and y are not functions of m seems to also
imply that p and y are not functions of u.
19Alternative classes of identifying assumptions include
those that involve restrictions on the long-run impact of
shocks to monetary policy.  See, for example, Gali (1991)
and King and Watson (1992).  A class of identifying
assumptions that does not employ the recursiveness
assumption in the text is analyzed in Bernanke (1986) and
Sims (1986), among others.  A class of assumptions that
does use the recursiveness assumption, but extracts mon-
ey shocks from interest rate data is reported in Bernanke
and Blinder (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992,
1995), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996a,b).
20Although the sign of the interest rate response appears
reasonably robust to subsamples, the use of monthly data
and other defensible strategies for identifying shocks, the
magnitude is not.  Monetary shocks based on the use of
nonborrowed reserves suggest a smaller interest rate
effect more recently.  See Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992), Pagan and Robertson (1995), and Christiano
(1995).  However, other methods for calculating monetary
shocks do not have this implication.
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